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INTRODUCTION 
 Professor Jean Sternlight has written about the need for examining the in-
tegrated nature and relationship between alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
and civil procedure.1 ADR and civil procedure are integrated in practice, but 
unfortunately, these two fields are commonly viewed and studied separately in 
the legal academy.2 When one takes an integrated approach in studying the 
fields of civil procedure and ADR, common, underlying themes come to light, 
and this integrated approach can broaden our understanding of procedural jus-
tice and the multiple purposes of our justice system.3 Similarly, Professor Deb-
orah Hensler and Damira Khatam, as part of this symposium volume, have 
written a persuasive article demonstrating the value of examining different do-
mains of arbitration in a more comprehensive, broad manner.4 
Inspired by Professor Sternlight’s work and the symposium contribution of 
Professor Hensler and Damira Khatam, this article examines arbitration law 
through a broader framework—the framework of procedure. The main thesis of 
this article is that one can develop a better understanding of arbitration law by 
viewing arbitration as part of a broader, procedural framework for dispute reso-
lution. The first section of this article explores a problematic tension in arbitra-
tion cases from the Supreme Court of the United States. As explained below, 
from case-to-case and sometimes even within a case, the Supreme Court flip-
flops in its conceptualization of arbitration. However, as explained in the se-
cond part of this article, one can easily resolve this tension in the Supreme 
Court’s arbitration decisions by situating arbitration law within a broader pro-
cedural framework. The final part of this article stresses the importance of ana-
lyzing arbitration through a broader procedural lens. There are several lessons 
about arbitration that one can observe by focusing on the procedural nature of 
arbitration. For example, by examining the role of procedure in a legal system 
and examining the differences between substance-specific and transsubstantive 
models of procedural regulation, one can learn important lessons about arbitra-
tion law. An exploration of arbitration through a broader lens of procedure sug-
gests ways to improve arbitration law and redefine the meaning of arbitration in 
our laws. This Article proposes that courts should interpret the meaning of arbi-
tration under the Federal Arbitration Act by using a definition of arbitration that 
incorporates procedural principles. 
                                                        
1  Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal 
Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 681 (2005). 
2  Id. 
3  Id. at 710, 716. 
4  See Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the 
Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and 
Public Adjudication, 18 Nev. L.J. 381, 381 (2018). 
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I.  THE FAULT LINES IN THE SUPREME COURT’S ARBITRATION CASES 
 There is significant tension in arbitration law because the Supreme Court 
of the United States has been inconsistent in its treatment or conceptualization 
of arbitration. The Court in some cases conceptualizes the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement as a substantive right. Yet, in other cases, the Court ap-
pears to re-conceptualize the enforcement of an arbitration agreement in an en-
tirely different manner, as a procedural right. The Court has even vacillated be-
tween its different views of arbitration within the same case. 
A. The Supreme Court Sometimes Conceptualizes the Enforcement of An 
Arbitration Agreement as a Substantive Right  
 In a series of preemption decisions spanning over several decades, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly treated the enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
as a substantive right. In its landmark decision of Southland Corp. v. Keating in 
1984, which involved state court proceedings in a franchise dispute, the appli-
cable state law guaranteed a judicial forum for the resolution of franchise dis-
putes.5 As a result of this state law, state courts refused to enforce arbitration 
agreements in connection with alleged violations of state franchise laws.6 The 
Supreme Court, however, held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)7 applies 
in state court proceedings and preempted state laws banning arbitration, and as 
a result, the arbitration agreements at issue were fully enforceable under the 
FAA with respect to the franchise disputes.8 In order to reach its preemption 
conclusion, the Supreme Court in Southland characterized the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA as “a substantive rule applicable in 
state as well as federal courts.”9 
As textual support for its Southland holding, the Court selectively focused 
on certain language from section two of the FAA,10 which generally states that 
an arbitration agreement is fully binding.11 By narrowly focusing on this partic-
ular language of the statute, and ignoring the rest of the statute, the Court 
claimed to discover only two limitations regarding the enforceability of an arbi-
tration agreement under the FAA: first, the agreement to arbitrate must be part 
of a contract involving interstate commerce, and second, arbitration agreements 
                                                        
5  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1984). 
6  Id. at 5. 
7  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). 
8  Southland, 465 U.S. at 16. 
9  Id. 
10  Id. at 10–16. 
11  9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 
18 NEV. L.J. 511, SZALAI - FINAL 3/27/18  5:34 PM 
514 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:511  
may be revocable upon generally-applicable grounds for the revocation of any 
contract, such as fraud or unconscionability.12 By narrowly focusing on this 
part of the statute and by claiming to see only two restrictions, which did not 
impact the issue at hand, the Court hastily jumped to its conclusion that the 
FAA contains no limits regarding its application in state courts, and thus, the 
FAA applies in state courts.13 In conceptualizing the enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement as a substantive right, the Court also cited the plenary authority 
of Congress, pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.14 The Court explained that the FAA “rests on the authority of Congress to 
enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.”15 Thus, the enforcement 
of an arbitration agreement pursuant to the FAA is a substantive right, which 
state courts must respect pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion.16 In the decades following the Southland decision, the Supreme Court re-
lied on Southland in several cases to hold that one’s right to enforce an arbitra-
tion agreement, as a substantive right under federal law, overrides conflicting 
state laws.17 
B. The Supreme Court Sometimes Conceptualizes the Enforcement of An 
Arbitration Agreement as a Procedural Right 
Interspersed among the Supreme Court’s rulings characterizing the FAA as 
substantive law are other, conflicting Supreme Court decisions treating the 
                                                        
12  Southland, 465 U.S. at 10–11 (“We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of 
arbitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.” (emphasis added)). There 
are other requirements or limitations in Section 2 of the FAA, which the Court conveniently 
overlooked in Southland and in future cases. According to 9 U.S.C. § 2, the FAA’s coverage 
is limited to written provisions in a contract “to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract.” Statutory claims, such as the ones at issue in Southland, do not 
necessarily arise out of a contract, and thus, the FAA should not apply to such claims. The 
FAA was originally designed for commercial, contractual disputes, not statutory claims. Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court has overlooked this important limitation in the text of the 
statute. 
13  Southland, 465 U.S. at 16. 
14  Id. at 11. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. at 11–16. 
17  For example, in Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 531 (2012), the 
Court addressed a state court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement because of a state 
law forbidding the use of arbitration agreements in connection with wrongful death claims 
against nursing homes. Relying on the principle established in Southland that both “[s]tate 
and federal courts must enforce the [FAA],” the Court in Marmet easily concluded that the 
right to enforce arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA overrides the conflicting state 
law banning arbitration. Id. at 530, 533. Similarly, in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 
(1987), the Court described the FAA as “a body of federal substantive law . . . enforceable in 
both state and federal courts,” and the Court held that the FAA preempts a state law forbid-
ding arbitration in wage disputes. In several other cases, the Court has relied on the substan-
tive nature of the FAA to apply the FAA in a state court proceeding in order to oust state 
law. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017). 
18 NEV. L.J. 511, SZALAI - FINAL 3/27/18  5:34 PM 
Winter 2018] RECONCILING FAULT LINES 515 
FAA as procedural law. The year after the Court decided Southland, the Court 
issued a landmark decision characterizing the enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement as procedural. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., the Court explained that through an agreement to arbitrate, “a 
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by [a] statute; it only sub-
mits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”18 In 
Mitsubishi, the Court treated the enforcement of an arbitration agreement as a 
procedural right, with no impact on substantive rights. As explained by the 
Court in Mitsubishi, when parties agree to arbitrate, the parties are merely 
“trad[ing] the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the 
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”19 Similarly, in Scherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., the Court characterized an agreement to arbitrate as a pro-
cedural tool to resolve the rights of the parties under substantive law: “An 
agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind 
of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the pro-
cedure to be used in resolving the dispute.”20 Also, in EEOC v. Waffle House, 
Inc., the Supreme Court was careful to emphasize that the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement “only determines the choice of forum” for resolving a 
dispute about one’s substantive rights.21 Thus, in a series of several cases span-
ning decades, the Court has conceptualized the enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement as procedural in nature.22 
As the above examples illustrate, the Supreme Court has vacillated in its 
treatment of arbitration from case-to-case, and there is both a procedural and 
substantive strand of arbitration decisions from the Court. From the 1980s to 
present day, the Court has intermittently treated the enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement as a substantive right, as in Southland, Perry, and Marmet. 
However, interspersed among this substantive line of cases are other cases, like 
Mitsubishi, Scherk, and Waffle House, where the Supreme Court has embraced 
the enforcement of an arbitration agreement as a mere procedural tool to define 
or determine substantive rights, without impacting substantive rights. 
C. Explaining the Court’s Inconsistent Conceptualization of Arbitration 
How can one explain the Court’s flip-flopping treatment of arbitration over 
the years? A cynical explanation is that the Court, primarily since the 1980s, 
has been expanding the FAA beyond its original, intended coverage, perhaps as 
                                                        
18  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
19  Id. 
20  Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). 
21  EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002) (emphasis added). 
22  See also Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009) (conceptualizing the enforcement 
of an arbitration agreement as merely a procedural tool or a process geared towards the reso-
lution of an underlying merits dispute, which is the focus of the inquiry regarding subject 
matter jurisdiction under the FAA). 
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a way to alleviate overcrowded judicial dockets and limit access to courts.23 To 
help support the expansion of the FAA, it appears that the Court will flip-flop 
and utilize either characterization regarding the enforcement of an arbitration 
clause—be it procedural or substantive—so long as that characterization allows 
the Court to reach its ultimate goal of expanding the FAA in that particular 
case. For example, in some of the Court’s procedural cases like Mitsubishi, the 
Court expanded the FAA beyond contractual disputes to cover statutory claims 
of a public nature.24 Before this period of expansion, the FAA was historically 
used to facilitate the arbitration of contractual claims, not statutory claims.25 
However, in a series of decisions such as Mitsubishi and Shearson/Am. Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon, it became clear that the Court sought to expand the 
FAA beyond contractual claims to cover statutory claims.26 To help justify the 
expansion of the FAA regarding the arbitrability of statutory claims, it was im-
portant for the Court to treat the enforcement of arbitration agreements as a 
procedural right. It was important in these cases regarding arbitrability for the 
Court to portray the FAA as broadly-applicable procedural law of a transsub-
stantive nature. In other words, to make this new pill regarding the arbitrability 
of statutory claims easier to swallow, the Court sugarcoated the enforcement of 
an arbitration agreement as merely procedural and as having no impact on sub-
stantive rights.27 The Court’s procedural characterization in Mitsubishi and sim-
ilar cases, in other words, may help convey a sentiment such as the following: 
there is no need to worry about expanding the FAA beyond contractual claims 
to cover the resolution of statutory claims because arbitration is merely proce-
dural; enforcing an arbitration agreement will not impact important statutory or 
substantive rights, like securities or civil rights claims, because arbitration is 
merely a neutral process to resolve such claims. 
However, in other cases where there is a state law potentially curtailing the 
use of arbitration, where the Court desired to justify the expansion of the FAA 
into the states, the Court recasts the enforcement of an arbitration agreement as 
a substantive right, which thereby enables the Court to hold that the state law is 
preempted.28 Thus, one possible explanation of the Court’s flip-flopping treat-
                                                        
23  IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—NATIONALIZATION—
INTERNATIONALIZATION, 172 (1992) (“One cannot immerse oneself in the arbitration cases 
without coming to the conclusion that a major force driving the Court is docket-clearing pure 
and simple.”). 
24  Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627–28. 
25  IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS 
IN AMERICA (2013). 
26  Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627–28; Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 
238 (1987). 
27  Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (“[A] party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by 
[a] statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”); 
see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 314 n.10 (2002) (“We have held that 
federal statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements that are enforceable 
pursuant to the FAA because the agreement only determines the choice of forum.”). 
28  See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
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ment of arbitration is that the Court appears to engage in a chameleon-like re-
conceptualization of arbitration depending on whether the particular conceptu-
alization assists the Court in justifying its ultimate conclusion, which is typical-
ly a judicial re-writing or expansion of the scope of arbitration law in further-
ance of a court-manufactured policy in favor of arbitration.  
 The Supreme Court’s conflicting and tortured treatment of arbitration is in 
full view in its decision of Preston v. Ferrer.29 In Preston, a California law 
granted a state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising 
under California’s laws regarding talent agents.30 In holding that the FAA 
preempts the state law granting exclusive jurisdiction to the state commission-
er, the Court in Preston quoted from and relied on its Southland decision to 
demonstrate that the FAA, as a substantive law applicable in both state and fed-
eral courts, preempts state laws undermining this substantive right to enforce an 
arbitration agreement.31 The Southland strand conceives the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement as a substantive right under federal law,32 and Preston re-
lied on this strand of arbitration law to justify the expansive displacement of 
state law that occurs in Preston.33 
The Supreme Court’s displacement of state law in Preston is breathtaking 
in scope. The underlying dispute at issue involved a state law concern unique to 
California: the licensing of talent agents in California’s entertainment indus-
try.34 To carry out and enforce these state rights, and resolve disputes regarding 
these state-created rights, California bestowed a state agency with the exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear these special disputes.35 States should have sovereign au-
thority to control the procedures by which their very own state-created rights 
are enforced, and federal intrusion on how a state chooses to enforce its own 
state-created rights raises serious federalism concerns.36 As a result of the Pres-
ton case, which flows from the Court’s substantive conceptualization of the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements in Southland, states can no longer design 
and require specialized administrative tribunals with exclusive jurisdiction to 
implement fundamental state policies and resolve disputes arising solely under 
state law. This Preston case reflects and is based on the view that the enforce-
ment of an arbitration clause is a substantive right created by Congress under 
the FAA. 
                                                        
29  Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008). 
30  Id. at 351. 
31  Id. at 353. 
32  Southland, 465 U.S. at 16. 
33  Preston, 552 U.S. at 353. 
34  Id. at 354–55. 
35  Id. at 351. 
36  Hardware Dealers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931) (“[T]he 
procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs remedied is peculiarly a subject of 
state regulation and control,” and states have broad, exclusive powers to adopt any procedure 
for the enforcement of rights, as long as the procedure “satisfies the constitutional require-
ments of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.”). 
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However, at the same time while embracing the substantive view of arbi-
tration to displace the state law, the Preston Court is careful to highlight the 
procedural nature of arbitration: 
[The enforceability of an arbitration agreement] presents precisely and only a 
question concerning the forum in which the parties’ dispute will be heard. . . . So 
here, [the plaintiff, who must arbitrate,] relinquishes no substantive rights the 
[California Talent Agencies Act] or other California law may accord him.37  
In other words, while relying on the substantive conceptualization of the 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement to justify preemption of state law, the 
Preston Court simultaneously stresses that the enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement is procedural in nature because an arbitration agreement does not set 
forth any rules of decision or rules regulating life outside of the legal system. 
Instead, an arbitration agreement simply identifies the method, forum, or pro-
cess for enforcing substantive rights and resolving substantive disputes.38 
Why did the Court in Preston go out of its way to highlight the procedural 
nature of arbitration, while at the same time treating arbitration as substantive 
in other parts of its opinion? Perhaps the Court was aware that its ruling would 
raise serious federalism concerns and result in a severe displacement of state 
law granting exclusive jurisdiction to a state administrative agency, and to help 
alleviate such federalism concerns, the Court was careful to emphasize that on-
ly procedures were being changed and the parties’ substantive rights under state 
law would not be impacted. The Court’s characterization of arbitration as pro-
cedural in nature suggests that an arbitration tribunal would be fully competent 
to hear and resolve the claims at issue without impacting the substantive rights 
of the parties. Perhaps, to alleviate concerns arising from the severe displace-
ment of state law, the Court in Preston relied on the procedural nature of arbi-
tration to suggest that the same outcome should occur regardless of whether the 
case is heard in an arbitral forum or before a special state commissioner. It is 
almost as if the Court in Preston attempted to gloss over the serious federalism 
concerns arising from its substantive treatment of arbitration by simultaneously 
highlighting the procedural nature of arbitration. 
 In sum, there is significant tension in the Supreme Court’s conceptualiza-
tion of arbitration. In some cases, the enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
is treated as a substantive right, and in other cases, or even within the same 
case, the Court stresses that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is pro-
cedural in nature. 
                                                        
37  Preston, 552 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
38  Id. 
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II. RESOLVING THE TENSION IN THE SUPREME COURT’S ARBITRATION 
DECISIONS BY SITUATING ARBITRATION WITHIN A BROADER PROCEDURAL 
FRAMEWORK 
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its 
conceptualization of arbitration agreement enforcement.39 How should this ten-
sion in arbitration law be resolved? One can easily resolve this tension in the 
Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions by properly situating arbitration law 
within a broader procedural framework. When arbitration is properly viewed as 
part of a broader procedural framework for resolving disputes, it becomes clear 
that the substantive treatment of arbitration in the Supreme Court’s Southland 
decision is flawed. 
 The history of the FAA’s enactment, which demonstrates that the FAA was 
part of a larger movement for improving the administration of justice and re-
forming the judicial system, helps confirm the procedural nature of arbitra-
tion.40 During the early 1900s, the federal court system was broken, confusing, 
hypertechnical, and overwhelmed, necessitating a movement for procedural re-
form developed to cope with the problems plaguing the judicial system.41 There 
was a strong desire to reform procedures to make the resolution of disputes 
more efficient and streamlined; the FAA’s enactment was part of this broader 
movement for procedural reform and improving the administration of justice.42 
Viewing the FAA within its broader context of a larger movement of procedur-
al reform, both in the courts and in arbitration, helps one see more clearly the 
procedural nature of the FAA, contrary to the Supreme Court’s treatment of ar-
bitration in the Southland case. 
In addition to the history of the FAA’s enactment as part of a broader 
movement of procedural reform, the text of the FAA, the original understand-
ing of the FAA, constitutional concerns, and the concept of arbitration all 
demonstrate that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement should be treated 
as procedural in nature. The late Professor Ian Macneil, in his ground-breaking 
book, American Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization, Internationali-
zation, already conclusively and thoroughly confirmed that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Southland is deeply flawed because the FAA is procedural.43 
Professor Macneil’s key arguments are summarized below.  
In his landmark book, Professor Macneil observed that the FAA is a fully 
integrated, unitary statute designed to facilitate the different stages of arbitra-
tion—the FAA addresses the beginning of an arbitration proceeding, the arbi-
tration proceeding itself, as well as post-award issues.44 The Supreme Court in 
                                                        
39  See supra Part I. 
40  SZALAI, supra note 25, at 166–79. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  See generally MACNEIL, supra note 23. 
44  Id. at 105–07. 
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Southland reached its flawed holding by narrowly focusing on one section of 
the statute.45 However, when one properly considers the entire statute as a com-
prehensive, unitary framework designed to facilitate all stages of commercial 
arbitration, it becomes immediately apparent that the FAA is a statute applica-
ble solely in federal courts because the FAA is filled with references to the fed-
eral courts.46 The fully integrated nature of the FAA and the FAA’s explicit ref-
erences to federal courts make clear that, as a textual matter, Southland is 
wrongly decided; the FAA was never intended to be a substantive law applica-
ble in state courts.47  
Furthermore, at the time of the FAA’s enactment during the 1920s, the 
universal understanding of arbitration law was that it was procedural law.48 As 
recognized in a House Report,  
[w]hether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of 
procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought 
and not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of the forum in 
which the contract is made. Before such contracts could be enforced in the Fed-
eral courts, therefore, this law is essential.49 
Also, as explained above in the discussion regarding Preston, the FAA 
raises serious federalism concerns because of its displacement of state law.50 As 
a result of Southland’s flawed conceptualization of arbitration as a substantive 
right and the Supreme Court’s decision in Preston, states have lost their sover-
eign authority to design exclusive, specialized, unique administrative tribunals 
to implement fundamental state policies and resolve disputes arising solely un-
der state law.51 
Furthermore, the concept or definition of arbitration helps demonstrate the 
procedural nature of arbitration. Why do parties arbitrate? No one arbitrates in 
the abstract. Arbitration should be conceptualized as a bundle of procedures 
                                                        
45  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–16 (1984). 
46  See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or re-
fusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any Unit-
ed States district court. . . .”); 9 U.S.C. § 7 (“[I]f any person or persons so summoned to testi-
fy shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon petition the United States district court 
for the district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may compel the 
attendance of such person. . . .”); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (“In any of the following cases the United 
States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating 
the award. . . .”). 
47  MACNEIL, supra note 23, 105–07. 
48  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 286–89 (1995) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). 
49  H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924); MACNEIL, supra note 23, at 117. 
50  See supra notes 34–41 and accompanying text; see generally Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 
346 (2008). 
51  Maureen A. Weston, The Clash: Squaring Mandatory Arbitration with Administrative 
Agency and Representative Recourse, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 115–18, 136–37 (2015) (stat-
ing FAA’s preemptive impact on state administrative schemes violates constitutional guaran-
tees of federalism). 
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used to resolve a dispute; arbitration occurs in connection with an underlying 
dispute to be resolved, as recognized by the Supreme Court’s procedural treat-
ment of arbitration in Vaden v. Discover Bank.52 Arbitration is a procedural tool 
to enforce or resolve disputes about substantive rights, but arbitration itself 
does not define one’s substantive rights.53 Arbitration law does not regulate or 
impact one’s conduct outside of the context of resolving a dispute.54 The very 
notion of arbitration, as a method or bundle of procedures to enforce or resolve 
disputes about substantive rights, reinforces the procedural nature of arbitra-
tion. 
 The vacillation and inconsistencies of the Supreme Court in conceptualiz-
ing arbitration also help confirm that something is amiss with the Court’s hold-
ing in Southland. Although the Court has held in several cases that the en-
forcement of an arbitration agreement is a substantive right,55 the Court in other 
cases cannot avoid admitting or facing the reality that arbitration is procedural, 
not substantive law. For example, in Vaden v. Discover Bank, the Court held 
that federal courts must look through to the underlying merits dispute to deter-
mine whether the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an ar-
bitration agreement.56 This “look through” approach adopted in Vaden recog-
nizes the reality that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is merely a 
procedural tool or a process designed to resolve the underlying merits dispute 
between the parties. If the enforcement of an arbitration clause were truly a 
substantive right, as the erroneous Southland decision holds,57 then the en-
forcement of an arbitration clause would automatically give rise to federal 
question subject matter jurisdiction. Normally, a substantive right arising under 
federal law would automatically create federal question subject matter jurisdic-
tion.58 However, as demonstrated in Vaden, federal courts do not have automat-
ic subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement; instead, the 
Supreme Court in Vaden recognized that courts must “look through” and exam-
ine the underlying merits dispute to be resolved in arbitration in order to deter-
mine whether the court has jurisdiction to enforce this critical federal substan-
                                                        
52  Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2009); see also infra notes 63–69 and accom-
panying text. 
53  EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002) (“We have held that federal 
statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements that are enforceable pursuant to 
the FAA because the agreement only determines the choice of forum.”); see also Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By agreeing to 
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the stat-
ute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”). 
54  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that the 
difference between substantive laws and procedural laws involves rules that substantially 
impact “primary decisions respecting human conduct” outside the context of dispute resolu-
tion and rules that shape the conduct of dispute resolution). 
55  See supra Section I.A. 
56  Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62. 
57  See supra notes 8–19 and accompanying text. 
58  Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
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tive right.59 Confronted with this problem of a substantive law that fails to give 
rise to federal question jurisdiction, the Court in Vaden and in other cases has 
been forced to bluntly admit that the FAA is “something of an anomaly” in the 
entire field of federal subject matter jurisdiction.60 The Court glosses over the 
dissonance of a purported substantive federal right failing to give rise to subject 
matter jurisdiction by labeling and dismissing the problem as an “anomaly.”61 
In other words, the Supreme Court acknowledges that its treatment of arbitra-
tion as a substantive right creates a major aberration and problem in the field of 
subject matter jurisdiction, yet, dismisses its flawed treatment with an “is-what-
it-is” attitude with no further explanation or attempt to reconcile the jurisdic-
tional problem. 
However, instead of quickly dismissing the FAA’s jurisdictional issue as 
an inexplicable aberration that fails to comport with the rest of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the better resolution of this jurisdictional puzzle is that the en-
forcement of an arbitration clause is not a substantive federal right. Instead, the 
FAA is a procedural law. Properly recognized as a procedural law, the FAA 
does not give rise to federal question jurisdiction. No matter how many times 
the Court relies on the substantive nature of arbitration to preempt and displace 
state law, the Court, from time to time, must uncomfortably confront the ines-
capable reality that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is merely pro-
cedural.62 The flip-flopping nature of the Court’s characterization of arbitration 
and the Court’s inability to explain the “anomaly” involving the jurisdictional 
problems created by the Court’s substantive characterization emphasize the 
Court’s erroneous treatment of arbitration as a federal substantive right. 
 In sum, the Court’s conceptualization of the enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement as a federal substantive right is highly problematic in light of the 
history of the FAA’s enactment as part of a broader movement of procedural 
reform, the text of the FAA, the meaning of arbitration, and serious federalism 
and jurisdictional problems. Properly viewing the FAA through a procedural 
lens resolves this tension in arbitration law. The enforcement of an arbitration 
clause involves procedural, not substantive, law. 
                                                        
59  Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62 (“The text of § 4 drives our conclusion that a federal court should 
determine its jurisdiction by ‘looking through’ a § 4 petition to the parties’ underlying sub-
stantive controversy.”). 
60  Id. at 59; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 
(1983) (“The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court juris-
diction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to 
honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) or otherwise.”). 
61  Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59. 
62  See supra Section I.B. 
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III.  REDEFINING ARBITRATION BY EXAMINING ARBITRATION THROUGH A 
PROCEDURAL LENS 
As explained above in Part II, despite the Court’s inconsistent and flawed 
conceptualizations of arbitration, the enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
should be viewed as procedural. What ramifications flow from this principle 
that arbitration is procedural in nature? Exploring arbitration through a broader 
lens of procedure suggests ways to improve arbitration law and redefine arbi-
tration. Viewing arbitration as procedural demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in Southland is wrongly decided; clarifies the role of 
arbitration as an integrated part of our broader legal system; sharpens policy 
debates about the future of arbitration law; and suggests a way to redefine arbi-
tration in our laws.  
A. States Should Be Free to Experiment in Regulating Arbitration Because 
Southland is Wrongly Decided 
Because the enforcement of an arbitration clause is procedural in nature, 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Southland and its progeny are seriously 
flawed.63 States should be free to decide for themselves whether and under 
what conditions an arbitration clause is fully enforceable.64 The fact that an ar-
bitration agreement may not be fully enforceable under state law, while the 
same clause would be fully enforceable under the FAA in federal court, is not 
problematic. To paraphrase the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi, an agreement to 
arbitrate is just a change in forum and procedures.65 Litigating instead of arbi-
trating a dispute would involve differences in process costs and procedures, to 
be sure, but switching fora would not be the end of the world. Having different 
fora for the resolution of disputes is inherent in the nature of our federalist sys-
tem. Forum shopping and having disputes resolved pursuant to different proce-
dural rules already occurs in the United States’ judicial systems when parties, 
without an arbitration clause, forum shop among different state court systems 
or when parties desire to remain in state court and intentionally craft their com-
plaints to avoid triggering subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. The fact 
that one government entity would be willing to enforce an arbitration clause, a 
procedural question, while another government entity would not enforce the 
same clause, should not impact the substantive rights of parties. When arbitra-
tion is properly understood and treated as procedural law, such acknowledg-
                                                        
63  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1984). 
64  PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 82–85, 121 (2013) (sacrificing 
the uniformity values of Southland would promote federalism values in the regulation of ar-
bitration). 
65  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded 
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It 
trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, infor-
mality, and expedition of arbitration.”). 
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ment of the procedural nature of arbitration should free states to experiment 
with regulating arbitration in different ways. 
B. Arbitration is an Integrated Part of Our Broader Legal System 
Understanding that arbitration is procedural, and that the FAA’s enactment 
was part of a broader movement for procedural reform highlights the role of 
arbitration within our broader legal system. The push for the FAA and the push 
for a uniform set of rules for the federal court system in the early decades of the 
twentieth century were part of the same larger movement for procedural re-
form, and these procedural developments grew out of the broken court system 
of the early 1900s.66 This background helps stress the role of the FAA and arbi-
tration as an integrated part of our broader legal system.67 The private systems 
of arbitration supported by the FAA serve as a safety valve for an overbur-
dened, broken court system.68 Also, arbitration serves as a competitive, con-
trasting foil to the traditional court system. If the courts are not functioning 
well, parties can take their disputes to private arbitration, and procedural inno-
vations in arbitration can influence the reform of court procedures.69 In other 
words, viewing arbitration as part of a broader movement for procedural reform 
helps reveal that different systems of dispute resolution are interrelated, and a 
robust system of arbitration can be healthy for a smoothly functioning court 
system.70  
C.  Improving and Redefining Arbitration 
1. The Transsubstantive Nature of Modern Arbitration Law  
 Understanding that arbitration is procedural in nature sharpens policy de-
bates about arbitration, which suggests ways to improve and redefine arbitra-
tion under the FAA. Today, as a result of the Supreme Court’s expansive inter-
pretations of the FAA, the FAA is a broadly applicable procedural law of a 
transsubstantive nature, and this final section of the Article explores the ramifi-
cations of such a procedural law. 
The FAA, which is textually limited to written provisions in a contract to 
arbitrate disputes arising out of the contract,71 was originally designed to cover 
contractual disputes between merchants of relatively co-equal bargaining pow-
                                                        
66  SZALAI, supra note 25, at 166–73. 
67  Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History, 
2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 130–34. 
68  Id. at 132. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 134. 
71  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (written provisions in a contract “to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract” are fully enforceable). 
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er.72 The FAA’s legislative history helps demonstrate that the statute was not 
designed for take-it-or-leave-it arbitration agreements imposed by a stronger 
party on a weaker party.73 By the very terms of the statute, which is limited to 
disputes arising out of a contract, the FAA was never intended to cover statuto-
ry claims or tort claims that could be asserted without reference to a contract.74 
Properly limited to contractual, commercial disputes, the FAA, as originally 
enacted, embodied a type of substance-specific model of procedural regulation.  
However, in a series of cases, beginning in the international context in the 
1970s and expanding to the domestic context in the 1980s, the Supreme Court 
transformed the FAA into a transsubstantive procedural statute and broadly ex-
panded the FAA to cover virtually every area of non-criminal law.75 Ignoring 
the clear text of the FAA, the Supreme Court has created a default rule that eve-
ry possible claim, statutory or non-statutory, is now subject to the FAA’s cov-
erage, unless Congress clearly provides otherwise.76 Moreover, courts today 
routinely apply the FAA to complex statutory claims, sexual battery claims, 
and wrongful death claims—claims that can be stated without reference to a 
contract and that were never intended to be covered by the statute as originally 
enacted.77 Furthermore, employment disputes were never intended to be cov-
                                                        
72  Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before 
the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7 (1924) (statement of Charles L. 
Bernheimer, Chairman, Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of 
New York) (FAA designed for disputes such as one between a seller of a carload of potatoes 
from Wyoming and a dealer from New Jersey); see also id. at 30–31 (statement of Wilson J. 
Vance, Secretary, New Jersey Chamber of Commerce) (arbitration legislation would help 
reduce “business litigation” and encourage “business men” to settle their “business differ-
ences”); id. at 41 (“If business men desire to submit their disputes to speedy and expert deci-
sion, why should they not be enabled to do so?”). The statute was designed for merchants 
who could bargain for the inclusion of an arbitration agreement as part of their transactions 
with one another, and a prototypical dispute covered by the FAA would be a commercial 
dispute about the quality of shipped goods between merchants in different states. 
73  Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commer-
cial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9–11 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). 
74  9 U.S.C. § 2 (FAA covers written provisions in a contract “to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising out of such contract”). 
75  See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (FAA covers 
all types of statutory claims, including civil rights claims, unless Congress specifically ex-
empts a particular statutory claim from arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrys-
ler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 
506, 510–11, 519–20 (1974). 
76  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626–28; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519–20. 
77  Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532–34 (2012) (wrongful death 
claims); In re Online Travel Co., 953 F. Supp. 2d 713, 720–21 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (antitrust 
claims); Anderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d at 687, 695 (E.D. La. 2013) (em-
ployee’s claims for sexual harassment and assault); IFMG Sec., Inc. v. Sewell, No. 13-10-
00235-CV, 2011 WL 5515528, at *3 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2011) (employee’s claims for sex-
ual harassment, assault, and battery). 
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ered by the FAA,78 but in 2001, the Supreme Court expanded the statute to 
cover employment disputes.79 The Supreme Court has broadly expanded the 
FAA far beyond its original intent so that the statute applies to all types of dis-
putes. 
With the increasing, expansive coverage of the FAA, the Supreme Court 
has fully transformed the FAA from a substance-specific procedural law cover-
ing contractual, commercial disputes into a transsubstantive procedural law 
covering all types of disputes.80 Scholars have debated the virtues of substance-
specific versus transsubstantive models of procedural regulation.81 Although 
substance-specificity in procedural rules can lead to more tailored procedures 
designed to better implement the policies of each area of substantive law, sub-
stance-specificity can lead to greater complexity in procedural law and wran-
gling over which body of procedural law controls.82 A universal, transsubstan-
tive model of procedural law, with its simplicity and flexibility, has its own 
inherent appeal and has dominated the modern federal civil procedure system 
through the “one-size-fits-all” Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Perhaps, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions expanding the coverage of the FAA to all types of 
disputes was influenced, at least in part, by the norm of transsubstantivity found 
in the governing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
How does the substance-specific vs. transsubstantive debate apply in the 
context of the FAA? In other words, in developing and improving arbitration 
law for the future, should the current transsubstantive norm continue to apply in 
arbitration law, or should arbitration law become more substance-specific? 
There is no easy answer to this policy choice. A reasonable proposal to reform 
the FAA is to move away from the transsubstantive nature of the FAA by de-
                                                        
78  SZALAI, supra note 25, at 191–92 (examining historical evidence demonstrating that the 
FAA was never intended to apply to employment disputes). 
79  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). 
80  Arbitration rules set forth in a particular agreement or developed by an arbitration institu-
tion can be, and often are, substance-specific. For example, the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation has rules designed for employment disputes and a separate set of rules designed for 
construction disputes. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N., EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND 
MEDIATION PROCEDURE (2016); AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2016). Although particular arbitration 
rules used in an arbitration proceeding may be focused and substance-specific, the FAA pro-
cedural law regulating and facilitating the use of arbitration has grown to be transsubstantive 
and applies broadly to every type of arbitration proceeding, such as consumer, employment, 
construction, or complex commercial arbitration proceedings. 
81  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Asser-
tions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2067, 2067–68 (1989); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the 
Future: Subrin’s New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Prob-
lem,” 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 78 (1994); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive 
Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
377, 377 (2010) (“I have argued for three decades that the underlying transsubstantive phi-
losophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is flawed.”). 
82  Carrington, supra note 81, at 2081. 
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veloping more substance-specific arbitration law as well as different rules for 
distinctive settings or uses of arbitration. For example, to be more protective of 
consumer and employee rights, a rational proposal would be to better tailor ar-
bitration law to implement the policies of consumer protection statutes and em-
ployment statutes. One could develop heightened standards of meaningful con-
sent for consumer and employment arbitration agreements. Another reform 
could involve increasing the level of judicial review for statutory claims involv-
ing consumer and employment disputes. To the contrary, perhaps the FAA 
could become very substance-specific and be limited solely to contractual dis-
putes between merchants, as originally intended, and be amended to exclude 
consumer, employment, and statutory claims from its coverage.83  
2. Risks of a Transsubstantive Model of Arbitration Law 
Although the simplicity of a transsubstantive model of procedure is appeal-
ing, there is a risk that a universal procedural rule may be applied in a harsh, 
inflexible, and unfair manner. For example, in the field of federal civil proce-
dure governing the courts, the Supreme Court’s landmark pleading decisions in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly have made some people 
question the continued wisdom of transsubstantive procedural rules.84 In Iqbal 
and Twombly, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal pleading standard as 
requiring that there must be sufficient factual allegations in a plaintiff’s com-
plaint to make a claim “plausible.”85 Several scholars believe this standard of 
plausibility pleading represents a departure from a more liberal system of no-
tice pleading adopted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938.86 Plausi-
bility pleading has been criticized as an improper, judicially created, more 
heightened form of detailed pleading not required by the Federal Rules.87 In the 
wake of Iqbal and Twombly, commentators have criticized the impact of the 
plausibility pleading standards in cases where defendants are likely to be in ex-
clusive possession of evidence of wrongdoing, such as civil rights and em-
ployment discrimination cases, and commentators have also called into ques-
                                                        
83  See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017). 
84  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007). 
85  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. 
86  Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton 
Handler, and the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. LITIG. 1, 17 
(2008) (“The Twombly holding marks a significant retreat from the concept of notice plead-
ing and certainly the end of notice pleading as envisioned by the drafters of the Federal 
Rules.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008) (Su-
preme Court’s plausibility standard is “quite at odds with the Court’s position heretofore” 
and is a “break from the Court’s previous embrace of notice pleading.”). 
87  Spencer, supra note 86, at 433. 
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tion the values of transsubstantive procedures in light of the harsh, disparate 
impact of the new pleading standard on certain types of substantive cases.88  
As demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s controversial Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions, there is a risk that “one-size-fits-all” universal procedural rules are 
not nuanced enough and can be applied in a harsh, unfair manner to undermine 
the enforcement of substantive laws. Similarly, consider the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,89 where the Court announced 
a seemingly transsubstantive procedural law under the FAA, which could have 
a harsh, disparate impact on certain types of cases. Rent-A-Center involved a 
delegation clause, by which the parties to an arbitration agreement delegated to 
an arbitrator the authority to resolve issues about the formation and enforceabil-
ity of an arbitration agreement.90 The Supreme Court in Rent-A-Center held that 
challenges to an arbitration agreement do not invalidate a narrow, specific del-
egation clause within an arbitration agreement.91 As a result, an arbitrator will 
resolve challenges to the enforcement of an arbitration clause, and if an arbitra-
tion agreement contains arguably unconscionable terms, an arbitrator instead of 
a court will determine whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable.92 It 
seems that the Court’s holding in Rent-A-Center, although transsubstantive on 
its face and applicable to all types of cases, could have a harsh, disparate im-
pact on consumer and employment cases. When two sophisticated parties have 
relatively equal bargaining power, they may negotiate the terms of an arbitra-
tion clause, and with such meaningful consent, it is unlikely that one party 
would be harmed by an unfair, harsh clause. In other words, the Rent-A-Center 
holding may have less of an impact on two sophisticated parties who negotiate 
and consent to all of the details of an arbitration agreement. However, in the 
consumer and employment context, where meaningful consent is often lacking, 
there may be harsh terms in the arbitration agreement drafted by a stronger cor-
porate party, and under the Rent-A-Center decision, an arbitrator—instead of a 
court—will determine the enforceability of the arbitration agreement if the arbi-
tration agreement contains a delegation clause.93 Consumers and employees are 
                                                        
88  See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: 
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 517, 570 (2010) (“We have to recognize the disparate impact of transsubstantive pro-
cedure on civil rights and discrimination claims.”); Scott Foster, Note, Breaking the 
Transsubstantive Pleading Mold: Public Interest Environmental Litigation After Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 885, 885–86 (2011) (explaining that the 
transsubstantive plausibility pleading standard is inappropriate for public interest environ-
mental litigation). 
89  Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010). 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 72. 
92  See, e.g., Lloyd v. BRSI, LLC, No. CIV-15-964-M, 2016 WL 234861, at *2 (W.D. Okla. 
Jan. 19, 2016) (enforcing a delegation clause in arbitration agreement); Williams v. Omain-
sky, No. 15-0123-WS-N, 2015 WL 8056142, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 3, 2015) (enforcing a 
delegation clause in arbitration agreement). 
93  See Lloyd, 2016 WL 234861, at *2; Williams, 2015 WL 8056142, at *6. 
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the parties who are more likely to be involved with challenges to harsh terms of 
a one-sided arbitration clause since sophisticated parties with bargaining power 
are probably more likely to have the ability to protect themselves in negotiating 
an arbitration agreement.  
Vulnerable consumers or employees would likely benefit from the broader 
procedural protections available in court when litigating the issue of an arbitra-
tion clause’s enforceability, as opposed to having an arbitrator resolve the is-
sue. For example, broader discovery would likely be available in court and al-
low parties to conduct depositions or engage in other discovery regarding the 
making of an arbitration agreement. Also, by having courts decide these 
threshold issues of whether a valid agreement exists in the consumer and em-
ployment context, a body of published and publicly available decisions will de-
velop regarding the enforceability and fairness of certain provisions in an arbi-
tration clause. These judicial decisions would generally be subject to appellate 
review, which could promote consistency in the judicial decisions. Further-
more, in the consumer and employment settings, when a court enforces a dele-
gation clause such that an arbitrator will resolve the enforceability of harsh 
terms in an arbitration clause, such decisions may undermine public confidence 
in the judicial system. An injured victim of discrimination or a consumer who 
has been cheated may feel that the courts have harshly shut the door because 
the courts will not hear the underlying dispute and to add insult to injury, the 
courts will not even strike down an obviously harsh or unfair arbitration provi-
sion. Instead, it would be up to the arbitrator to review the harsh provision and 
perhaps merely sever the harsh provision from the rest of the arbitration clause. 
The “one-size-fits-all” rule regarding delegation clauses created by the Su-
preme Court’s Rent-A-Center decision, although transsubstantive on its face, 
would appear to have a harsher impact in certain types of cases. 
Another example of the harshness of a transsubstantive arbitration law in-
volves judicial vacatur of arbitral awards. Historically, the grounds for judicial 
vacatur of an arbitral award have been very narrow and courts have sometimes 
described this level of review as the narrowest review known in American 
law.94 When the FAA was first enacted during the 1920s, this narrow level of 
review may have been appropriate for contractual disputes about the quality of 
goods shipped between two merchants of relatively co-equal bargaining power 
who understood the finality of arbitration and willingly consented to this sys-
tem. However, with the Supreme Court’s transsubstantive expansion of the 
FAA, critical statutory claims of public interest, such as civil rights claims, are 
now captured under the finality of arbitration developed for contractual dis-
putes, and instead of a one-size-fits-all arbitration law, a rational argument 
                                                        
94  Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 123 (1st Cir. 2008) (“A federal 
court’s review of an arbitrator’s decision, however, is extremely narrow and exceedingly 
deferential. Indeed, it is among the narrowest known in the law.” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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could be made for a more substance-specific arbitration law with increased ju-
dicial review of arbitral awards involving consumer or employment claims. 
3. Redefining the Meaning of Arbitration under the FAA Through the 
Lens of Procedure 
Although reasonable arguments could be advanced for a more substance-
specific model of arbitration law, the track record of arbitration reform in Con-
gress is not encouraging for any substantial legislative reforms of America’s 
arbitration laws.95 It is unlikely that significant reforms to arbitration law will 
take place any time soon, and it looks like a transsubstantive model of arbitra-
tion law may be here to stay for the foreseeable future. Thus, if the United 
States legal system must continue with a transsubstantive model of arbitration 
law, what are the ramifications? 
If America’s arbitration laws remain transsubstantive, it is important that 
the procedural law embodied in the FAA be flexible enough so that the FAA 
would be applied in a fair manner and not undermine the policies and enforce-
ment of substantive rights. Although the relationship between substance and 
procedure is complex, at least one major goal or value of procedural law that 
has been advanced over time is that procedural law should be subordinate to the 
goals of substantive justice.96 Procedural rules can be justified by “their effec-
tiveness in making easier and surer the application of the principles of substan-
tive law.”97 There is a strong view that procedural rules should be supportive of 
substantive rights and not frustrate the enforcement of substantive rights.98 To 
help justify the legal system in the public’s eye, an individual’s rights should 
not be undermined by the flawed procedural enforcement of those rights. 
The Supreme Court has already recognized to some degree in its arbitration 
cases that procedural law should be subordinate to substantive law. In its land-
mark case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the 
Court issued one of its strongest statements about the procedural nature of arbi-
tration.99 In holding that complex statutory antitrust claims are arbitrable under 
the FAA, the Court characterized arbitration agreements as a type of forum se-
lection clause setting forth “not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to 
be used in resolving the dispute.”100 In addressing concerns that an arbitration 
tribunal would not be adequate to handle complex claims or implement the 
                                                        
95  Several bills, called the Arbitration Fairness Act, have been introduced in Congress over 
the years in order to amend the FAA, but the bills have died out in committee. See, e.g., Ar-
bitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013). 
96  See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938). 
97  Charles E. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals, 1 CONN. B.J. 67, 68 (1927). 
98  Clark, supra note 96, at 304; Clark, supra note 97, at 67–68; see also Roscoe Pound, The 
Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 602 (1926). 
99  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
100  Id. at 630 (citation omitted). 
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goals of antitrust law, the Court made the following critical statement: “And so 
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum, the [federal antitrust] statute will continue to serve 
both its remedial and deterrent function.”101 This statement in Mitsubishi, which 
sets forth what has been called the “effective vindication” doctrine, recognizes 
the normative principle that arbitration, or procedural law in general, should not 
undermine substantive law. 
It is important to recognize the context in which the Court proclaimed the 
effective vindication doctrine. The FAA was originally intended to apply only 
to commercial, contractual disputes arising out of a contract.102 Statutory rights, 
which do not arise out of a contract, were not intended to be covered by the 
statute. In Mitsubishi, and in a series of other cases, the Court expanded the 
scope of the FAA to cover statutory claims.103 Thus, in Mitsubishi, the Court 
was breaking into new territory and expanding the FAA, and to alleviate con-
cerns about this expansion to complex statutory claims, the Court announced 
the effective vindication doctrine.104 The Court was in effect saying that there is 
no need to worry about the expansion of the FAA; arbitration of statutory 
claims is entirely appropriate. By announcing the effective vindication doctrine, 
the Court recognized a parameter or limit to arbitration: arbitration of statutory 
claims will not be allowed if the arbitration process undermines the enforce-
ment of substantive laws. The effective vindication doctrine was announced or 
recognized in the particular context of this case to help justify the Court’s judi-
cial expansion of the FAA to cover statutory claims. 
 Since the announcement of the effective vindication doctrine in 1986 in 
Mitsubishi, lower courts have used the effective vindication doctrine to monitor 
the fairness of arbitration agreements and strike down harsh, one-sided provi-
sions in such agreements. For example, in the case of Gourley v. Yellow 
Transp., LLC, the arbitration agreement contained three separate harsh terms, 
which frustrated the ability of employees to assert sexual harassment claims.105 
At the front end, the agreement imposed excessive fees on the plaintiffs who 
could not afford to pay.106 The district court, citing precedent that arbitration 
agreements cannot prevent parties from effectively vindicating their rights, held 
that the excessive fees would prevent the parties from fully enforcing their 
rights.107 Similarly, in the middle, the agreement restricted the arbitration hear-
ing to one day, with the possibility of two days for “unusual circumstances and 
                                                        
101  Id. at 637. 
102  See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
103  Id. 
104  Imre Stephen Szalai, More than Class Action Killers: The Impact of Concepcion and 
American Express on Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 31, 56 n.176 
(2014). 
105  Gourley v. Yellow Transp., LLC, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Colo. 2001). 
106  Id. at 1203–04. 
107  Id. 
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good cause shown.”108 Because of the complexity of the case, the district court 
found that the one or two-day limitation for hearings made the arbitral forum 
inadequate for the plaintiffs to vindicate their rights.109 Furthermore, at the back 
end, the agreement prohibited the plaintiffs from submitting post-hearing evi-
dence, which would prevent the plaintiffs from vindicating their right to the 
statutory award of attorneys’ fees in cases arising under federal civil rights 
laws.110 In sum, for all three stages of the arbitration proceeding, the beginning, 
middle, and end, the arbitration clause at issue contained harsh, one-sided terms 
that prevented the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their rights, and the 
district court easily concluded that the arbitration agreement was not enforcea-
ble.111 
 Although the effective vindication doctrine was a well-established and use-
ful principle of arbitration law for decades following the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Mitsubishi in 1985, the Supreme Court unfortunately undermined the 
effective vindication doctrine, designating it to be mere dicta, in the 2013 case 
of American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.112 In this case, mer-
chants filed a class action lawsuit in court to challenge certain credit card fees 
of American Express as violations of federal antitrust law.113 In response to the 
lawsuit, American Express asked the court to compel each merchant to arbitrate 
individually pursuant to arbitration clauses in the contracts between the mer-
chants and American Express.114 The arbitration clauses contained class-action 
waivers forbidding the merchants from proceeding collectively as a class.115 
However, if each merchant had to bring individual proceedings, the costs of 
proving the antitrust claims through expert witnesses could reach more than $1 
million, which would easily exceed a potential individual recovery of perhaps 
$40,000.116 In other words, if forced to bring individual arbitration proceedings, 
the merchants could not effectively vindicate their rights. The appellate court 
held that the arbitration agreements were not enforceable because the agree-
ments prevented the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their rights.117 
 In a majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that 
under the FAA, courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements on the 
grounds that the agreements do not permit collective or class claims.118 Reason-
ing that arbitration agreements must be enforced as written pursuant to the 
                                                        
108  Id. at 1204. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. at 1204–05. 
111  Id. at 1205. 
112  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013). 
113  Id. at 2308. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 2309–10. 
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FAA, the Court found that the class-action waiver was fully enforceable.119 
Turning to a discussion of the antitrust laws, the Court explained that the anti-
trust laws do not prevent class-action waivers, and in fact, the federal antitrust 
laws were enacted decades before the modern class-action rule was even adopt-
ed, which suggests that the individual resolution of antitrust claims is not prob-
lematic.120 In the final section of the majority opinion, the Court addressed and 
dismissed arguments about the effective vindication doctrine.121 
 Regarding the effective vindication doctrine, the majority quickly dis-
missed the doctrine as “judge-made” and mere “dictum” originating in the 
Mitsubishi case.122 The majority described the doctrine as designed to “prevent 
‘prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.’ ”123 With 
such a definition of the effective vindication doctrine, the majority opined that 
the doctrine would invalidate “a provision in an arbitration agreement forbid-
ding the assertion of certain statutory rights.”124 Also, the doctrine “would per-
haps cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high 
as to make access to the forum impracticable.”125 However, according to the 
majority, the high cost of “proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the 
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”126 As a result, the effective vin-
dication doctrine did not apply in this case. Even though the class-action waiver 
would make it economically irrational for anyone to bring individual antitrust 
claims, because a rational person would not spend $1 million to recover 
$40,000, the class-action waiver was fully enforceable.127 
 Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, wrote a dissent.128 
Justice Kagan explained that the effective vindication doctrine, instead of being 
mere dictum, was critical to the holding of Mitsubishi: “We held [in Mitsubishi] 
that federal statutory claims are subject to arbitration ‘so long as’ the claimant 
‘effectively may vindicate its [rights] in the arbitral forum.’ The rule thus 
served as an essential condition of the decision’s holding.”129 Also, pursuant to 
this doctrine, Justice Kagan argued that the class-action waiver in this case is 
not enforceable. Justice Kagan explained that an explicit exculpatory clause 
barring the assertion of a federal claim would clearly be unenforceable as an 
improper prospective waiver of one’s rights.130 However, as observed by Jus-
                                                        
119  Id. at 2309. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. at 2310–12. 
122  Id. at 2310. 
123  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 2310–11. 
126  Id. at 2311. 
127  Id. at 2308, 2310, 2312. 
128  Id. at 2313. 
129  Id. at 2317 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 637 (1985)). 
130  Id. at 2314. 
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tice Kagan, there are several other ways a stronger party can in effect bring 
about the same immunity and frustrate the vindication of one’s rights through-
out the different stages of an arbitration proceeding: 
On the front end: The agreement might set outlandish filing fees or establish an 
absurd (e.g., one-day) statute of limitations, thus preventing a claimant from 
gaining access to the arbitral forum. On the back end: The agreement might re-
move the arbitrator’s authority to grant meaningful relief, so that a judgment 
gets the claimant nothing worthwhile. And in the middle: The agreement might 
block the claimant from presenting the kind of proof that is necessary to estab-
lish the defendant’s liability—say, by prohibiting any economic testimony (good 
luck proving an antitrust claim without that!). Or else the agreement might ap-
point as an arbitrator an obviously biased person—say, the CEO of Amex. The 
possibilities are endless—all less direct than an express exculpatory clause, but 
no less fatal.131 
Instead of being limited to just prospective waivers of the right to pursue or 
assert a claim from the very beginning, Justice Kagan treated the effective vin-
dication doctrine as broadly applicable to a variety of different arbitration stag-
es.132 With this broader, more comprehensive view of the effective vindication 
doctrine, Justice Kagan believed that the class-action waiver at issue, which 
forced the merchants to bring individual claims, made the assertion of antitrust 
claims cost-prohibitive, and thus the arbitration clause did not allow the parties 
to vindicate their statutory rights.133 
 There is a tension between the majority’s and dissent’s view of the effec-
tive vindication doctrine. In addition to dismissing the doctrine as “judge-
made” “dictum,” the majority appeared to suggest a narrow, restricted view of 
the doctrine. The majority suggested the doctrine applies in one or perhaps two 
situations: “prospective waiver[s]” of the right to sue (as opposed to procedural 
provisions that made it more costly to prove a claim), and “perhaps” prohibitive 
upfront “filing and administrative fees.”134 Lower courts, taking their cue from 
                                                        
131  Id. (emphasis added). 
132  Id. at 2317–18 (stating that “[the effective vindication doctrine] covers the world of other 
provisions a clever drafter might devise to scuttle even the most meritorious federal claims” 
and providing several examples of harsh provisions). 
133  Id. at 2320. 
134  Id. at 2310–11. Justice Scalia mentioned “filing and administrative fees,” which probably 
includes the fee to initiate an arbitration before an arbitration association and covers the ad-
ministrative services provided by the arbitration association. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2016). (“Administrative 
Fees: The AAA charges a filing fee based on the amount of the claim or counterclaim. This 
fee information, which is included with these rules, allows the parties to exercise control 
over their administrative fees. The fees cover AAA administrative services; they do not cov-
er arbitrator compensation or expenses, if any, reporting services, or any post-award charges 
incurred by the parties in enforcing the award.”) (emphasis added). In his definition of the 
effective vindication doctrine, Justice Scalia noticeably did not mention the fees or expenses 
of arbitrators, who may receive hourly or daily rates. An arbitrator’s fees would, of course, 
vary depending on the complexity of the case and how much evidence or testimony a party 
wishes to present; arbitrators’ fees would vary with the difficulty and time in presenting and 
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the majority’s restrictive, weakened view of the effective vindication doctrine, 
are also taking a narrow view of the doctrine in the wake of American Ex-
press.135 The dissent in American Express, on the other hand, adopted a more 
comprehensive, robust, and flexible definition of the effective vindication doc-
trine. The dissent recognized that the doctrine would apply to any provision 
that prevents the vindication of one’s rights, regardless of whether the provision 
restricts access to the proceeding from the front end or very beginning, makes 
the proceeding itself an inadequate forum, or restricts the grant of certain relief 
at the back end.136  
 Justice Kagan’s broader view of the effective vindication is more appropri-
ate for arbitration law than the stringent, limited view adopted by the majority. 
As mentioned above, lower courts for several decades prior to the American 
Express decision have applied the effective vindication doctrine to strike down 
harsh provisions involving all stages of an arbitration proceeding, regardless of 
whether the provision impacts the beginning, middle, or end of a proceeding.137 
Justice Kagan’s broader, more comprehensive, robust view of the effective vin-
dication doctrine represents a more realistic view of procedure as having the 
ability to impact the resolution of a dispute at any stage of a proceeding.138 Ka-
                                                                                                                                 
proving a case. Based on Justice Scalia’s narrow view of the effective vindication doctrine, 
which applies to prospective waivers of the right to sue and not provisions giving rise to 
high, variable costs associated with proving a more complex case, an argument could be 
made that high arbitrator’s fees are not covered by Justice Scalia’s crimped, weakened view 
of the effective vindication doctrine, since arbitrator’s fees are likely to vary depending on 
the complexity of proving a particular case. In other words, Justice Scalia’s choice of terms, 
“administrative and filing fees,” may have been intended to exclude arbitrator’s fees from 
the coverage of the effective vindication dictum, but this is not clear. Litigants and lower 
courts have not, as of yet, explicitly relied on this aspect of Justice Scalia’s opinion and the 
difference between “filing fees” and arbitrator’s fees to hold that the effective vindication 
doctrine does not apply to excessive arbitrator’s fees. But see Byrd v. SunTrust Bank, No. 
2:12-CV-02314-JPM-cgc, 2013 WL 3816714, at *18 (W.D. Tenn. July 22, 2013) (“[The Su-
preme Court’s American Express decision] appears to make it more difficult for Plaintiffs to 
show that the Arbitration Clause is unenforceable due to high fees associated with arbitra-
tion.”). 
135  Sierra v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int’l, N.V., 631 F. App’x 714, 718 (11th Cir. 
2015) (relying on American Express’s treatment of the effective vindication doctrine as dic-
tum to reject the application of the doctrine); Torres v. CleanNet, U.S.A., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 
3d 369, 378 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (relying on American Express’s treatment of the effective vindi-
cation doctrine as dictum to find that the doctrine does not apply when the underlying merits 
claims are based on state law); Mercado v. Doctors Med. Ctr. of Modesto, Inc., No. 
F064478, 2013 WL 3892990, at *6, *7 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2013) (finding that the Ameri-
can Express decision “narrowed the ability of courts to invalidate arbitration agreements on 
the ground they inhibit or preclude vindication of statutory rights” and “cast[s] doubt on the 
continued validity” of older FAA decisions). 
136  Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2314. 
137  See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text. 
138  The landmark Erie doctrine from procedural law provides an interesting parallel and rec-
ognizes the principle that procedure, at any stage of a proceeding, may impact the resolution 
of a dispute. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine and the effec-
tive vindication doctrine are of course different doctrines. The effective vindication doctrine 
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gan’s more expansive view of the effective vindication doctrine is also im-
portant to help justify the fairness of arbitration proceedings as a legitimate, 
appropriate method for resolving disputes and for furthering the policies and 
enforcement of substantive law. It has been recognized that transsubstantive 
procedural rules should embody flexibility, so that such procedural rules may 
be fairly applied across a wide range of disputes.139 Because the FAA is 
transsubstantive procedural law, Justice Kagan’s more flexible, broader view of 
the effective vindication doctrine would help place courts in a better position to 
police or monitor arbitration agreements to ensure that a harshly designed arbi-
tration proceeding does not interfere or undermine the enforcement of substan-
tive rights. If a judge completely rejects the effective vindication or applies a 
weakened version of the doctrine because it is mere dicta, it will become more 
difficult for courts to monitor arbitration clauses for fundamental fairness. Or if 
a judge adopts a narrow view of the effective vindication doctrine as only ap-
plying to explicit exculpatory clauses, a judge may be unwilling to invalidate 
harsh procedural terms, such as a limitation on testimony or damages. Especial-
ly in the setting of consumer and employment disputes, where meaningful con-
sent is not likely to exist, a robust form of the effective vindication doctrine 
can, at least, help level the playing field to some degree by providing some as-
surance of a minimal degree of fairness in the proceedings.  
                                                                                                                                 
focuses on the appropriateness of an arbitral tribunal for the enforcement of substantive law. 
The Erie doctrine is instead motivated by concerns about forum shopping due to differences 
in procedures between state and federal court. However, Erie decisions to some degree re-
flect a concern that certain procedures are burdensome; Erie and its progeny recognize the 
possibility that some procedures could be so game-changing or burdensome that they en-
courage forum shopping. Like Justice Kagan’s view of the effective vindication doctrine as 
applying to all stages of an arbitration proceeding, Erie decisions reflect the reality that pro-
cedures could be burdensome or game-changing at any stage of a lawsuit. For example, the 
Erie doctrine has been applied to requirements about the posting of security and statute of 
limitations issues at the front end of litigation proceedings, issues regarding burden of proof 
and expert witness testimony during the middle of the litigation proceedings, and limitations 
on remedies at the end of proceedings. See, e.g., Gavin v. Club Holdings, LLC, No. 15-175-
RGA, 2016 WL 1298964 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2016) (applying Erie in connection with state 
law regarding statute of limitations); Buchwald v. Renco Grp., 539 B.R. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(applying Erie to limitation on damages); First Coast Energy, L.L.P. v. Mid-Continent Cas. 
Co., 286 F.R.D. 630, 632 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (applying Erie to requirements about posting of 
security bond); Burke v. Air Serv. Int’l, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2011) (apply-
ing Erie and finding that state rule regarding expert witness testimony would “impose[] a 
significant hurdle”); S. Union Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 581 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123, 124 
(D. Mass. 2008) (applying Erie to burden of proof issues); Ilro Prods., Ltd. v. Music Fair En-
ters., Inc., 94 F.R.D. 76, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying Erie to requirements about posting of 
security bond). The Erie doctrine, and its applicability to all stages of litigation, acknowl-
edges the notion that procedures can have an impact at any stage of dispute resolution, a no-
tion that is more consistent with Justice Kagan’s comprehensive view of the effective vindi-
cation doctrine than Justice Scalia’s more limited view. 
139  Carrington, supra note 81, at 2081 (explaining flexibility and generalism are guiding 
principles for transsubstantive rulemaking). 
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 Moving forward, how should arbitration law treat the effective vindication 
doctrine? Contrary to the majority’s opinion in American Express, the doctrine 
is not mere dictum. As pointed out by Justice Kagan in dissent, the effective 
vindication doctrine formed a critical part of the holding in Mitsubishi.140 Fur-
thermore, the effective vindication doctrine is more than just a part of the hold-
ing of Mitsubishi; one can argue that the effective vindication doctrine pre-
dates Mitsubishi and is enshrined within the FAA as part of the definition of the 
arbitration. Procedural law, as a general rule, should be subordinate to, and not 
interfere with, substantive rights. Similarly, as a procedural law, the FAA 
should embody the effective vindication doctrine and not interfere with sub-
stantive rights in any manner. Courts should recognize that a broad and flexible 
effective vindication doctrine is a critical component of the definition of arbi-
tration under the FAA. 
Although articulated and acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 
Mitsubishi, the effective vindication doctrine arguably has always been a part 
of the FAA. The concept of effective vindication should be inherent in the very 
meaning or definition of arbitration. Arbitration under the FAA embodies the 
concept of the effective vindication doctrine. Consider the alternative, under 
which the effective doctrine does not exist and is not embodied in the FAA. 
Under such an alternative, the federal statute would support agreements that in 
name appear to be a promise to arbitrate, but in practice, operate to suppress 
claims or frustrate the resolution of claims. For example, suppose a purported 
arbitration agreement sets forth a ridiculously short one-day statute of limita-
tions. Such an agreement should not even be defined as arbitration under the 
FAA, and as such, should not be enforceable under the FAA. A court refusing 
to apply the effective vindication doctrine to this example because of the nar-
row reading given by the American Express majority, whereby the doctrine 
would only apply to prospective waivers of the right to bring a claim, would be 
elevating form over substance. By labelling the effective vindication doctrine to 
be mere dicta, the majority in American Express is in effect saying the statute 
provides for the enforcement of written provisions to arbitrate, pursuant to rules 
that do not allow parties to effectively vindicate their rights. If the effective 
vindication doctrine does not exist, as suggested by the majority’s treatment of 
the doctrine as dictum in American Express, the FAA would mandate the en-
forcement of arbitration provisions that suppress claims and do not allow par-
ties to effectively vindicate their rights. The enforcement of such written provi-
sions providing de facto immunity would be absurd, and the effective 
vindication doctrine should be inherent in the very meaning or definition of ar-
bitration under the statute. Furthermore, by including the concept of effective 
vindication in the very definition of arbitration under the FAA, one avoids the 
                                                        
140  Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (“We held [in Mitsubishi] that federal statutory claims 
are subject to arbitration ‘so long as’ the claimant ‘effectively may vindicate its [rights] in 
the arbitral forum.’ The rule thus served as an essential condition of the decision’s holding.”) 
(citation omitted). 
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problems associated with applying state law doctrines of unconscionability, 
which may vary.141 To borrow a concept from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, where the Court opined about the “funda-
mental attributes” of arbitration, a fundamental attribute of arbitration should 
be its ability to resolve disputes in good faith through an effective process for 
the vindication of one’s rights.142 If an arbitration agreement contains harsh 
terms that set forth an ineffective process and that frustrate the ability to vindi-
cate one’s rights, such an agreement should not be considered arbitration under 
the FAA. 
CONCLUSION 
 By understanding the procedural nature of arbitration law, and borrowing 
general principles of procedural law, such as the subordinate role of procedural 
law within a legal system, one can thus redefine the concept of arbitration un-
der the FAA. 
 The Supreme Court’s conceptualization of arbitration has been incon-
sistent, and significant problems have arisen from the Supreme Court’s treat-
ment of arbitration as a substantive right. Viewing the enforcement of an arbi-
tration clause as a substantive right obscures the true nature of arbitration law 
and can hinder its proper development and role in our legal system. Viewing 
the enforcement of an arbitration clause as a substantive right disturbs the prop-
er balance and role of arbitration within our legal system, and such a flawed 
view can threaten to steamroll over other rights. Framing the enforcement of an 
arbitration clause as a substantive federal right creates or helps reinforce an im-
pression that there is a prevailing, absolute right to enforce arbitration clauses 
as written, at all costs, even if meaningful consent is lacking from weaker par-
ties, even if harsh, unfair terms exist within an arbitration clause, and even if 
enforcement results in an unconstitutional displacement of state’s rights. Treat-
ing arbitration law as a substantive right has led to the abuse of the arbitration 
process and negative impressions of arbitration in society.143  
However, as demonstrated by the procedural understanding of arbitration, 
arbitration serves an invaluable, integrated role in our legal system and in our 
                                                        
141  Compare Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(invalidating arbitration clause under California unconscionability doctrine), with Carter v. 
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 301 (5th Cir. 2004) (enforcing the identical 
arbitration clause under Texas unconscionability doctrine). By including the effective vindi-
cation doctrine as part of the definition of arbitration under the FAA, the doctrine would 
provide greater protection for parties and apply in all cases where the FAA governs. See 
Torres v. CleanNet, U.S.A., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 369, 378 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that the 
effective vindication doctrine does not apply to state law claims). 
142  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
143  See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking 
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/busin 
ess/dealboo/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/C4V 
R-ASD7]. 
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democratic society. Understanding arbitration as procedural in nature allows 
one to see arbitration in a clearer, truer light and helps restore arbitration to its 
proper role as supportive of one’s substantive rights. Well-established frame-
works, considerations, or values developed for procedural law can be applied to 
arbitration law to better understand and analyze arbitration doctrines, such as 
the effective vindication doctrine. If we are able to peel away the substantive 
mask created by the Court’s Southland decision, which is flawed and mislead-
ing, and if we instead recognize that the enforcement of an arbitration agree-
ment is procedural at its core, such a reconceptualization of arbitration within a 
procedural framework allows one to focus more appropriately on arbitration 
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